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FEB 2 6 2014 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff- ) NO. 41644 
) 
vs. ) Canyon Co. Case Nos. 
) CR-2008-23501 & CR-2011-20389 
MOSES OLIVAS, JR., ) 
) REPLY BRIEF 
Defendant ) ON REVIEW 
) 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
This Court Should Interpret The Amendment To Article V, Section 13 Of The Idaho 
State Constitution Consistent With Its Plain Language: When The Legislature 
Mandates A Minimum Sentence, The Courts Must Execute That Sentence 
The central question on review is one of constitutional interpretation. At issue is 
whether the term "mandatory minimum sentence" in Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho 
State Constitution means what it actually says, i.e., any "minimum sentence" which is 
mandated by statute, or is limited to "mandatory minimum term of confinement." The 
parties agree that, by its terms, Article V, Section 13 allows the legislature to 
circumscribe a district court's authority to suspend a sentence by imposing a mandatory 
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minimum sentence. The state argues that the minimum sentence which Idaho Code § 
18-8311 mandates (that probation be revoked and the sentences be served 
consecutively) is a "mandatory minimum sentence" as contemplated by Article V, 
Section 13. (Review, pp.7-9.) Olivas argues that the provision in Idaho Code § 18-
8311 does not provide such a "mandatory minimum sentence" because it does not 
prescribe a fixed term of confinement for the violation. (Response on Review, pp.6-13.) 
As support for his constitutional interpretation, Olivas relies in part on the Idaho 
Supreme Court's opinion in State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971). In 
McCoy, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the judiciary possessed the "inherent 
authority" to suspend mandatory minimum sentences. !!t at 240, 486 P.2d at 251. In 
response to this decision, Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution was 
amended to add the provision 
that the legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any 
crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory 
minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so 
imposed shall not be reduced. 
Idaho Const. Art. V, Sec. 13. The amendment to Article V, Section 13 directly confronts 
and overturns the Court's holding in McCoy. Olivas's reliance on McCoy is thus 
misplaced, as McCoy is no longer good law. 
If any portion of the Court's holding in McCoy survived the amendment to Article 
V, Section 13, this Court should take this opportunity to overturn whatever remains. 
Precedent should be preserved "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 
9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 
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660, 680 (1992) ("prior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly 
wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."). McCoy was both "manifestly 
wrong" and "unwise" the day it was decided, because clear precedent showed no 
inherent judicial authority to override the legislature's power to establish sentences. 
The majority in McCoy acknowledged that the Idaho State Constitution did not 
enumerate a specific authority to suspend sentences. McCoy, 94 Idaho at 238, 486 
P.2d at 250. The majority therefore sought this authority within "inherent powers" under 
the common law "reserved" to the Court at the adoption of the Idaho State Constitution. 
& at 238-39, 486 P.2d at 250-51. While acknowledging that the United States 
Supreme Court had clearly held that "there was no inherent power in the judiciary to 
suspend sentence" under the common law, see Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 
42-45 (1916), the majority, based on its view of the law's "persevering evolution toward 
enlightenment" in recent times, found that the common law from the 18th century did in 
fact grant such authority. McCoy, 94 Idaho at 238-40, 486 P.2d at 250-52. 
The majority failed to note that the United States Supreme Court, for its 
proposition that the common law did not grant courts an inherent power to suspend 
sentences, relied in part on precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court. See Ex parte 
United States, 242 U.S. at 47, n.1 (citing In re Peterson, 19 Idaho 433, 113 P. 729 
(1911 )). The precedent established in In re Peterson has a long history, which was 
sampled by the dissent in McCoy. See McCoy, 94 Idaho at 244-45, 486 P.2d at 255-56 
(McFadden, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Ensign, 38 Idaho 539, 223 P.230 (1924); In re 
Grove, 43 Idaho 775, 254 P. 519 (1927); In re Jennings, 46 Idaho 142, 267 P. 227 
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(1928)). The majority, far from responding to this precedent, or even attempting to 
distinguish it, did not deem these cases as worthy of so much as a footnote. 
Contrary to the majority's holding in McCoy, and as noted by the dissent, the 
authority to suspend a sentence was in fact conferred upon the courts of the State of 
Idaho by the legislature beginning with the 1915 amendment to Idaho Revised Code§ 
7991. McCoy, 94 Idaho at 244, 486 P.2d at 255 (McFadden, J., dissenting). The 
authority to suspend a sentence is now granted to our courts by the legislature in Idaho 
Code § 19-2601. Authority granted by the legislature may necessarily be restricted by 
that same body. The legislature may, and in fact does, define the criteria and factors 
that guide courts in applying their discretion to suspend a sentence and impose 
probation. See I. C. § 19-2521. 
Olivas's interpretation of the holding in McCoy and the effect of the subsequent 
amendment to Article V, Section 13 would have perverse consequences throughout the 
criminal law. For instance, under such an interpretation a district court could suspend a 
duly imposed capital sentence and place the convicted felon on probation, simply 
because a capital sentence does not specify a fixed period of incarceration. This Court 
should reject such an interpretation and interpret Article V, Section 13 consistent with its 
plain language: When the legislature mandates a minimum sentence, the courts must 
follow the law and execute that sentence. 
The Court's opinion in McCoy was overturned by the amendment to Article V, 
Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, which restored the legislature's authority to 
mandate that execution of a sentence not be suspended. If any part of McCoy survived 
that amendment, it should be overturned now. The McCoy opinion was "manifestly 
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wrong" and "unwise" and should not serve to justify the district court's failure to follow 
the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
reinstating Olivas on probation and remand this case for resentencing. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2014. 
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RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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